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At common law, death was deemed to occur at the moment circula-
tion and respiration ceased.' In determining the moment of death, no
consideration was given to brain function, because no method existed for
See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 488 (rev. 4th ed. 1968). Death is defined as:
The cessation of life; the ceasing to exist; defined by physicians as a total stoppage of
the circulation of the blood, and a cessation of the animal and vital functions conse-
quent thereon, such as respiration, pulsation, etc.
Id. (emphasis added); see Smith v. Smith, 229 Ark. 579, 586, 317 S.W.2d 275, 279 (1958);
Thomas v. Anderson, 96 Cal. App. 2d 371, 376, 215 P.2d 478, 481-82 (1950). The irreversible
cessation of heart and lung functions is also known as "clinical death." J. WALTz & F. INBAU,
MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE 228 (1971).
The focus on circulation and respiration grew out of the ancient notion that the heart
was the central organ of the body. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical
School to Examine the Definition of Brain Death, A Definition of Irreversible Coma, 205 J.
A.M.A. 337, 339 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Irreversible Coma]; Hirsh, Brain Death:
Medico-Legal Fact, or Fiction?, 3 N. Ky. ST. L.F. 16, 16 (1975). Prior to the nineteenth
century, the tests for determining the permanent cessation of circulation and respiration
were considered unreliable. See President's Comm'n for the Study of Ethical Problems in
Medicine and Biomedical Research, Defining Death, U.S. Supt. Docs., No. PR 40.8; ET 3/
D34, 13-14 (1981) [hereinafter cited as President's Comm'n]. Reports of reviving "corpses"
and clawed coffins, as well as medical articles citing putrefaction as the only sure sign of
death, undermined public confidence in the medical community. Id. In reaction to this, phy-
sicians began striving to perfect their skills, and ultimately developed more accurate instru-
ments, in particular the stethescope, for diagnosing death. Id. at 14-15. Nevertheless, de-
spite the advances of modern medicine, the "clinical detection of cessation of respiration
and heartbeat . . . is [still] subject to human error under adverse circumstances." 3 M.
Hourrs & 1. HAU', COURTROOM MEDICINE § 1B.00, at 1B-4 (1984).
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testing brain activity.2 Today the mechanical respirator has made it pos-
sible for physicians to continue a patient's respiration and circulation ar-
tificially, even after all brain functions have irreversibly ceased.3 This ad-
vancement has prompted the medical community to reevaluate its
traditional position on when the moment of death occurs.4 It is now
In re Bowman, 94 Wash. 2d 407, 412, 617 P.2d 731, 734 (1980) (en banc). Although brain
activity was not considered, it generally was known that the brain died shortly after the
cessation of the other vital functions. 3 M. Houts & I. Haut, supra note 1, § 1B.00, at 1B-3;
see Irreversible Coma, supra note 1, at 338. Indeed, the practice of pronouncing death upon
the cessation of heartbeat was fairly accurate because the heart, lungs and brain are so
interdependent that brain death necessarily occurs within thirty minutes of the cessation of
the other vital functions. See Guthrie, Brain Death and Criminal Liability, 15 CRIM. L.
BULL. 40, 46 (1979); President's Comm'n, supra note 1, at 16-17.
The first experiments aimed at recording the electrical activity of the human brain were
conducted by Dr. Hans Berger, a German psychiatrist, who published the first paper on the
human electroencephalogram (EEG) in 1929. C. BINNIE, A. ROWAN & T. GUTTER, A MANUAL
OF ELECTROENCEPHALOGRAPHIC TECHNOLOGY 1 (1982). An electroencephalogram is a record-
ing of the electrical activity of the cerebrum. Id. at 3. The electrical currents associated with
the brain cells are conducted through the saline solution that surrounds the brain, see ELEC-
TROENCEPHALOGRAPHY; A SYMPOSIUM ON ITS VARIOUS ASPECTS 65 (J. Hill & G. Parr ed. 1963),
and are transmitted to a recording device by means of electrodes placed on the scalp, id. at
59. Most normal EEGs show a rhythmic activity, C. BINNIE, A. ROWAN & T. GUTTER, supra,
at 20, which changes continually with changes in mental activity, emotional state, drowsi-
ness, or sleep, id. The typical EEG will also change gradually during the lifetime of an
individual and will vary among individuals. Id.
s 3 M. HOUTS & I HAUT, supra note 1, § 1B.00, at 1B-3. An artificial respirator actually
"ventilates" the body by forcing air into the lungs. See President's Comm'n, supra note 1,
at 15-16. This activity compensates for the inability of the thoracic muscle to perform this
function. See id. If the body is properly ventilated, "respiration" (the interchange of dis-
solved gases and metabolites across cell membranes) can take place. Byrne, O'Reilly, Quay,
& Salsich, Brain-Death-The Patient, The Physician, and Society, 18 GONz. L. REv. 429,
453 n.74 (1982-1983). Preservation of the body under such circumstances is limited; while a
child may be kept functioning for several weeks, an adult usually cannot be sustained more
than two to ten days. See President's Comm'n, supra note 1, at 17. However, because the
brain dies in stages and cellular decomposition of the other organs does not begin until all
components of the brain are dead, viable organs can be removed from the body at the mo-
ment of brain death and transplanted to a needy donor. See Hirsh, supra note 1, at 18.
Unlike a victim of brain death, apatient who is resuscitated at the moment of "clinical
death" may fully recover. Id. However, there may have been such a severe injury to the
brain that total and irreversible loss of function, or brain death, will result despite resuscita-
tion. See President's Comm'n, supra note 1, at 16. The most frequent causes of total and
irreversible loss of brain function are: 1) direct trauma to the head; 2) massive spontaneous
hemmorrhage into the brain; and 3) anoxic damage (due to absence of oxygen supply) as a
result of cardiac or respiratory arrest or severely reduced blood pressure. Id.
4 Hirsh, supra note 1, at 17; Note, The Uniform Determination of Death Act: An Effective
Solution to the Problem of Defining Death, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1511, 1512 (1982).
The problem of determining the precise moment of death took on added significance as
human organ transplants became more common. See Showalter, Determining Death: The
Legal & Theological Aspects of Brain-Related Criteria, 27 CATH. LAW. 112, 117 (1982).
When a potential heart donor has been clinically dead for more than a few minutes, a pro-
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widely accepted among physicians that a patient who has suffered a total
and irreversible cessation of brain function is dead, despite the fact that
breathing and heartbeat are maintained by a respirator.' The states in-
spective recipient's chances for survival with the new heart are slim. THE DYING PATIENT 108
(0. Brim, H. Freeman, S. Levine, & N. Scotch eds. 1970). Similarly, kidneys from such
donors have an 88% incidence of post-operative renal failure, while those received from
brain dead donors who are maintained on artificial respirators fail only between 10% and
20% of the time. See New York City Health & Hosps. Corp. v. Sulsona, 81 Misc. 2d 1002,
1005-06, 367 N.Y.S.2d 686, 689-90 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1975). Because the success of the
transplant depends upon whether or not the donated organ is "living," see 3 M. HouTs & I.
HAUT, supra note 1, § 1B.00, at 1B-4, it is crucial to determine whether or not the donor is
in fact dead; the removal of a vital organ from a live patient will be fatal and may expose
the physician to civil or criminal liability, see Sulsona, 81 Misc. 2d at 1006, 367 N.Y.S.2d at
690. See generally S. WiLcox & M. SUTTON, UNDERSTANDING DEATH AND DYING-AN INTER-
DISCIPLINARY APPROACH 54 (1977) (early transplants prompted concern for protecting physi-
cians against malpractice and homicide charges); Guthrie, supra note 2, at 60 (transplant
surgeons face possibility of criminal liability if brain death not legally accepted).
In response to the need for certainty in determining whether or not an artificially main-
tained prospective donor is indeed dead, an ad hoc committee of the Harvard Medical
School undertook an in-depth study of the characteristics of the brain dead patient. See
Irreversible Coma, supra note 1; see also infra note 5. Its report established the following
criteria as indicative of brain death: 1) unreceptivity and unresponsivity to even the most
painful stimuli; 2) an absence of spontaneous muscular movements or spontaneous respira-
tion over a period of at least one hour; 3) an absence of elicitable reflexes; and 4) a flat
electroencephalogram (valued as corroborative, but not dispositive). See Irreversible Coma,
supra note 1, at 337-38. The test must be repeated 24 hours later with no change, and the
physician must eliminate hypothermia and central nervous system depressants as causative
factors. See id. at 338. Subsequent studies have attempted to augment this list by sug-
gesting that the absence of cerebral blood flow is also evidence of brain death. See A Collab-
orative Study, An Appraisal of the Criteria of Cerebral Death-A Summary Statement,
237 J. A.M.A. 982, 982 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Appraisal Summary]; Hirsh, supra note
1, at 25 & n.36. Nevertheless, the Harvard criteria generally have been considered quite
reliable, President's Comm'n, supra note 1, at 25, and have been cited most frequently by
the courts in brain death cases, see, e.g., Lovato v. District Court, 198 Colo. 419, 426-27, 601
P.2d 1072, 1076 (1979) (en banc); In re Haymer, 115 Ill. App. 3d 349, 354 n.9, 450 N.E.2d
940, 945 n.9 (1983); State v. Meints, 212 Neb. 410, 420, 322 N.W.2d 809, 815 (1982); In re
Bowman, 97 Wash. 2d 407, 4i8, 617 P.2d 731, 737 (1980) (en banc).
In re Haymer, 115 Ill. App. 3d at 353-54 & n.8, 450 N.E.2d at 944 & n.8; Swafford v. State,
421 N.E.2d 596, 598 (Ind. 1981); Abram, The Need for Uniform Law on the Determination
of Death, 27 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 1187, 1189 (1982); Leng, Death and the Criminal Law, 45
MOD. L. Rv. 206, 210 (1982).
Total brain death is distinguishable from the state of coma, referred to as a "chronic
vegetative state," see 3 M. HouTs & I. HAUT, supra note 1, § 1B.00, at 1B-5, or "cerebral
death," see Guthrie, supra note 2, at 48. A certain amount of confusion has arisen over the
use of these terms, because some authors use them interchangeably. See, e.g., 3 M. HouTS &
I. HAUr, supra note 1, § lB.00, at 1B-80; Irreversible Coma, supra note 1, at 337. See gener-
ally President's Comm'n, supra note 1, at 87 (irreversible coma "is used as an umbrella
term for a variety of comatose states"). "Brain death," however, actually refers to the total
and irreversible loss of all brain functions, and includes both cerebral death (evidenced by
loss of consciousness and personality manifestations) and brain stem death (evidenced by
29 CATHOLIC LAWYER, AUTUMN 1985
creasingly have shown deference to this medical position by incorporating
a total brain death standard into their legal definitions of death.' Re-
loss of the autonomic nervous functions). Leng, supra, at 206 n.3 (citing 2 The Lancet 1311
(1979)). Patients in a chronic vegetative state, on the other hand, suffer irreversible brain
damage, but retain the ability to perform such vital functions as respiration, cardiac con-
tractions, regulation of blood pressure, and temperature control. 3 M. HOUTS & I. HAUT,
supra note 1, § 1B.00, at 1B-5. In addition, a minimal degree of cerebral activity may be
present. Id.
Some reversible conditions may simulate brain death. Appraisal Summary, supra note
4, at 983. Therefore, in order to diagnose brain death correctly, these disorders must be
eliminated as possible explanations of the patient's physical state. Id. The deceptive condi-
tions include: sedative drug intoxication; hypothermia; cardiovascular shock; and cerebral
lesion. Id. at 983-84.
Laymen and physicians who have refused to accept the concept of brain death some-
times have been criticized for adhering to the misconception that a person can recover from
a total loss of brain functions. Comment, Lovato v. District Court: The Dilemma of Defining
Death, 58 DEN. L.J. 629, 631 (1981). In cases in which such recoveries have been alleged, the
individuals were not actually dead, but had been misdiagnosed through faulty application of
the criteria. See Veith, Fein, Tendler, Veatch, Kleiman & Kalkines, Brain Death: I. A Sta-
tus Report of Medical and Ethical Considerations, 238 J. A.M.A- 1651, 1652 (1977). There
are no recorded incidents of brain dead patients regaining any functions when the Harvard
criteria have been fulfilled. See In re Haymer, 115 Ill. App. 3d 349, 356, 450 N.E.2d 940, 946
(testimony of physician); see also Veith, Fein, Tendler, Veatch, Kleiman & Kalkines, supra,
at 1652 (no incidence of recovery in 2,642 case studies when Harvard criteria met).
A group of staunch critics has asserted that a determination of death should be based
upon the total anatomic destruction of the heart and lungs, and not upon the cessation of
their function. See Byrne, O'Reilly, Quay & Salsich, supra note 3, at 494; Byrne, O'Reilly &
Quay, Brain Death-An Opposing Viewpoint, 242 J. A.M.A. 1985, 1985-86 (1979). Some con-
sider this view to be unsound and note that anatomic destruction can be established only by
pronouncing the patient dead and removing the organs for examination. See Veith & Ten-
dler, In Response to an Opposing Viewpoint on Brain Death, 243 J. A.M.A. 1808, 1808
(1980); see also Horan, Definition of Death: An Emerging Consensus, 16 TRIAL 22, 26 (Dec.
1980) (one does not ordinarily wait for anatomical destruction of tissue before pronouncing
death).
' See, e.g., State v. Fiero, 124 Ariz. 182, 185-86, 603 P.2d 74, 77-78 (1979); In re Haymer,
115 Ill. App 3d at 354, 450 N.E.2d at 943; Swafford v. State, 421 N.E.2d 596, 602 (Ind. 1981);
Commonwealth v. Golston, 373 Mass. 249, 250-51, 366 N.E.2d 744, 747 (1977), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1039 (1978). Traditionally, the common law relied on the expertise of the medical
profession in formulating its definition of death. See In re Bowman, 94 Wash. 2d at 412, 617
P.2d at 734; Abram, supra note 5, at 1192. However, the legal community was reluctant to
update its longstanding position of death as medical science became more sophisticated and
incomprehensible to the layman. Abram, supra note 5, at 1193-94; see also In re Estate of
Schmidt, 261 Cal. App. 2d 262, 273, 67 Cal. Rptr. 847, 854 (1968) (cessation of circulation
and respiration proper definition of death despite medical developments using irreversible
coma to mark point of death). Fear of civil and criminal liability, however, prompted physi-
cians to exert pressure on the legal profession for adoption of the brain death standard. See
Showalter, supra note 4, at 126-27.
To date, at least thirty-four states have enacted brain-death statutes and nine have
incorporated the standard by judicial fiat. See People v. Eulo, 63 N.Y.2d 341, 353 n.22, 472
N.E.2d 286, 293 n.22, 482 N.Y.S.2d 436, 443 n.22 (1984). There is an absence of uniformity
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cently, in People v. Eulo, 7 the New York Court of Appeals held that de-
fendants who cause the total brain death of their victims can be convicted
of manslaughter, even though the victims' circulation and respiration are
being artificially maintained.8
Eulo involved two separate homicide convictions that were consoli-
dated on appeal. 9 In both cases, the defendants had shot their victims in
the head,' 0 rendering them incapable of breathing without the aid of res-
pirators."' Various tests, repeated over the course of several days, indi-
cated that each victim had suffered a total and irreversible cessation of
among the statutes, which fall into four broad categories: (1) statutes providing for alterna-
tive determinations of death, based on either brain death or cardiac functions, see, e.g., KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 77-205 (1984); (2) statutes providing for a determination of death based on an
absence of brain function, only when there is also an irreversible cessation of spontaneous
respiratory and circulatory functions, see, e.g., MICH. STAT. ANN. § 14.15 (1021) (Callaghan
Supp. 1985); (3) statutes providing for a determination of death based solely on cessation of
brain function, see, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 /2 § 302 (b) (Smith-Hurd 1978); and (4)
statutes providing that a person may be pronounced dead if he or she has suffered an irre-
versible cessation of spontaneous brain function, see, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 146.001 (1983);
see Horan, supra note 5, at 23-24.
In an attempt to promote national uniformity, the National Conference of Commission-
ers on Uniform State Laws has proposed a model statute, the Uniform Brain Death Act,
which formed the basis for the current Uniform Determination of Death Act. President's
Comm'n, supra note 1, at 119. The act provides that:
An individual who has sustained either (1) irreversible cessation of circulatory and
respiratory functions, or (2) irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain,
including the brain stem, is dead. A determination of death must be made in accor-
dance with accepted medical standards.
Id. The American Bar Association, the American Medical Association and the President's
Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral
Research support adoption of this definition. See Eulo, 63 N.Y.2d at 353-54, 472 N.E.2d at
293-94, 482 N.Y.S.2d at 443-44. Several states have changed their statutes to reflect the
Uniform Determination of Death Act. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7180 (West
Supp. 1985); GA. CODE ANN. § 88-1716 (Supp. 1984); IDAHO CODE § 54-1819 (Supp. 1985).
Recognizing the growing legal acceptance of the brain death concept, Black's Law Dic-
tionary revised its definition of death in the fifth edition:
DEATH. The cessation of life; permanent cessation of all vital functions and
signs. Numerous states have enacted statutory definitions of death which include
brain-related criteria.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 360 (5th ed. 1979).
63 N.Y.2d 341, 472 N.E.2d 286, 482 N.Y.S.2d 436 (1984).
See id. at 346, 472 N.E.2d at 288-89, 482 N.Y.S.2d at 438-39.
' See id. at 345, 472 N.E.2d at 288, 482 N.Y.S.2d at 438.
See id. at 346-47, 472 N.E.2d at 289, 482 N.Y.S.2d at 439. In People v. Eulo, the defen-
dant shot his girlfriend after an argument over a suitor. Id. at 346, 472 N.E.2d at 289, 482
N.Y.S.2d at 439. In People v. Bonilla, the inebriated defendant shot a marijuana dealer with
whom he had been arguing. See 95 App. Div. 2d 396, 397, 467 N.Y.S.2d 599, 601 (2d Dep't
1983), aff'd, 63 N.Y.2d 341, 472 N.E.2d 286, 482 N.Y.S.2d 436 (1984).
" See 63 N.Y.2d at 346-47, 472 N.E.2d at 289, 482 N.Y.S.2d at 439.
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brain function, despite medication and artificial respiration."2 Fearing an
imminent cessation of breathing and circulation despite artificial mainte-
nance, the attending physicians obtained consent from the victims' par-
ents for the use of certain organs for transplantation. '3 The victims were
pronounced dead and the donated organs were removed.' 4 Upon discon-
nection of the respirators, the victims' breathing and heartbeats immedi-
ately ceased. 5
The defendants were found guilty of manslaughter and both convic-
tions were affirmed by the Appellate Division.' On appeal, both defen-
dants maintained that their conduct did not cause death 7 because
"death" traditionally had been defined in New York as an irreversible
cessation of breathing and heartbeat, and the victims were still breathing
when the transplants were performed.' 8 The Court of Appeals, however,
affirmed the two convictions, 9 noting that a judicial recognition of brain-
based criteria actually would not conflict with prior judicial and statutory
definitions of death. 0
Chief Judge Cooke, writing for a unanimous court, reviewed the
evolution of the total brain death standard and noted its increasing ac-
" See id. at 346-48, 472 N.E.2d at 289, 482 N.Y.S.2d at 439-40. In Eulo the victim showed
no reaction to painful stimuli. Id. at 346, 472 N.E.2d at 289, 482 N.Y.S.2d at 439. An elec-
troencephalogram (EEG) produced flat readings, indicating that there was no activity in the
part of the brain tested. Id. Three days later these tests were repeated -with the same re-
sults. See id. at 347, 472 N.E.2d at 289, 482 N.Y.S.2d at 439. The neurosurgeon's diagnosis
of brain death was reviewed and confirmed by the Deputy Medical Examiner for Suffolk
County and another physician. See id.
In Bonilla, the attending physician tested for reflex reactions, reactions to painful stim-
uli, and spontaneous breathing. See id., 472 N.E.2d at 289-90, 482 N.Y.S.2d at 439-40. An
EEG produced flat readings. See id. at 348, 472 N.E.2d at 290, 482 N.Y.S.2d at 440.




37 Id. at 345, 472 N.E.2d at 288, 482 N.Y.S.2d at 438.
18 See id. at 348, 472 N.E.2d at 290, 482 N.Y.S.2d at 440.
19 See id. at 360, 472 N.E.2d at 298, 482 N.Y.S.2d at 448.
2* See id. at 355, 472 N.E.2d at 294, 482 N.Y.S.2d at 444; see also Commonwealth v. Gol-
ston, 373 Mass. 249, 253-54, 366 N.E.2d 744, 748 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1039 (1978).
In discussing the traditional definition of death, the Goston court stated that "references to
respiration and pulsation must be taken to refer to spontaneous rather than artificially sup-
ported functions." 373 Mass. at 254, 366 N.E.2d at 748. The court also noted that the ex-
pansive interpretation of the traditional definition represented an "evolutionary restate-
ment" of the common law, and not a different rule. Id., 366 N.E.2d at 749 (quoting
Commonwealth v. McHoul, 352 Mass. 544, 547, 226 N.E.2d 556, 558 (1967)). Medical science
now recognizes that cessation of respiration and circulation alone are not determinative of
death; rather, they are "indicative of death only when they persist long enough for the brain
to die." In re Haymer, 115 II. App. 3d 349, 351, 450 N.E.2d 940, 942 (1983) (quoting Sweet,
Brain Death, 299 NEw ENG. J. MED. 410, 410 (1978)).
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ceptance among the states.2" The court saw no impediment to judicial
recognition of the concept, despite the failure of the New York Legisla-
ture either to approve a brain death standard,22 or to provide an express
definition of the term "death."2 " The court noted that, while the phenom-
enon of death never changes, the criteria for determining it have changed
to account for the fact that today "a dead body may be attached to a
machine so as to exhibit demonstrably false indicia of life."2 The court
asserted that judicial recognition of such "changed conditions" is sup-
ported by the declaration of the Legislature that the "Penal Law should
be construed 'according to the fair import of [its] terms to promote jus-
tice and effect the objects of the law.' " Synthesizing the common law
approach to the determination of death with the present day medical po-
sition, the court fashioned a broad rule of law:
[o]rdinarily, death will be determined according to the traditional criteria of
irreversible cardio-respiratory repose .... When, however, the respiratory
and circulatory functions are maintained by mechanical means, . . . death
may nevertheless be deemed to occur when, according to accepted medical
practice, it is determined that the entire brain's function has irreversibly
ceased.
26
The court confined its holding to cases involving only total loss of brain
function, distinguishing cases in which some brain functions still persist.2 7
Chief Judge Cooke applied this rule to the issue of whether the de-
fendants caused the deaths of their victims. 28 The court noted that, de-
spite the trial courts' failure to instruct the juries on the definition of
death, the juries were properly charged that the surgical procedures could
11 See 63 N.Y.2d at 349-54, 472 N.E.2d at 290-94, 482 N.Y.S.2d at 440-44.
2 See id. at 355, 472 N.E.2d at 294, 482 N.Y.S.2d at 444; infra note 52.
13 See 63 N.Y.2d at 354, 472 N.E.2d at 294, 482 N.Y.S.2d at 444. Since medical science has
made the transplantation of organs possible, the issue of criminal responsibility has received
renewed attention. See id. at 355, 472 N.E.2d at 294, 482 N.Y.S.2d at 444. In Eulo, Chief
Judge Cooke asserted that these developments make it necessary for the court to "instill
certainty and uniformity in these important areas." Id.
24 Id. at 356, 472 N.E.2d at 295, 482 N.Y.S.2d at 445.
25 Id. at 356-57, 472 N.E.2d at 295, 482 N.Y.S.2d at 445 (quoting N.Y. PENAL LAW § 5.00
(McKinney 1977)).
26 Id. at 355-56, 472 N.E.2d at 295, 482 N.Y.S.2d at 445.
'7 See id. at 358 n.30, 472 N.E.2d at 296 n.30, 482 N.Y.S.2d at 446 n.30. The Eulo court
declared that its decision had no bearing on the issue of whether third parties can decide to
allow terminally ill patients to die. Id. at 357, 472 N.E.2d at 295-96, 482 N.Y.S.2d at 445-46.
The "right to die," for example, is frequently raised when a patient has previously indicated
that he would not wish to be kept alive by a respirator or other extraordinary means. See,
e.g., JFK Memorial Hosp. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921, 922 (Fla. 1984) (terminally ill pa-
tient had executed a "living" or "mercy" will).
" See 63 N.Y.2d at 358-60, 472 N.E.2d at 296-97, 482 N.Y.S.2d at 446-47.
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be considered superseding causes of death.2 " However, the court asserted
that the transplants would have been superseding causes only if the pro-
nouncements of death were premature and had resulted from the "gross
negligence or the intentional wrongdoing" of the doctors "as determined
by a grave deviation from accepted medical practices or disregard for le-
gally cognizable criteria for determining death."3 The court found that
there was substantial expert testimony indicating that the tests were in
accordance with accepted medical practice.3 1 In addition, the court noted
that the doctors had some legal authority for using brain death criteria,
since a lower court decision had previously accepted the total brain death
standard.3 2 The court held, therefore, that the juries properly found that
the transplants did not break the chain of causation linking the defen-
dants with their victims' deaths3 and it affirmed both convictions.34
FILLING THE GAPs OF Sulsona AND Bonilla
It is submitted that the Court of Appeals' adoption of a total brain
death standard for homicide cases has filled a critical void in New York
law. The only prior recognition of the brain death criteria in New York
was at the supreme court level.3 " In New York City Health & Hospitals
Corp. v. Sulsona,3 6 the supreme court, Bronx County, held that the word
" See id. at 358-59, 472 N.E.2d at 296-97, 482 N.Y.S.2d at 446-47.
Id. at 359, 472 N.E.2d at 297, 482 N.Y.S.2d at 447. If patients are properly diagnosed as
dead prior to the transplant, no subsequent surgery can be deemed the cause of death. Id. If
the pronouncement of death is premature because of the doctors' negligence, the subsequent
surgery can be considered a cause of death, but not a superseding cause. Id.
3' See id. at 360, 472 N.E.2d at 297, 482 N.Y.S.2d at 447. Chief Judge Cooke explained that
it would be inappropriate for the court to set forth particular medical tests to be used in
diagnosing total brain death, because this would inhibit the development of more sophisti-
cated medical techniques. Id. at 357 n.29, 472 N.E.2d at 296 n.29, 482 N.Y.S.2d at 446 n.29.
The court's role was limited to the determination of whether the physicians' procedures
conformed to the accepted medical practice. Id.
" See id. at 360, 472 N.E.2d at 297, 482 N.Y.S.2d at 447 (citing In re New York City Health
& Hosps. Corp. v. Sulsona, 81 Misc. 2d 1002, 367 N.Y.S.2d 686 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County
1975)); see also infra notes 35-40 and accompanying text. The court noted that the holding
in Sulsona had not been overturned by the Legislature nor any appellate court. See 63
N.Y.2d at 360, 472 N.E.2d at 297, 482 N.Y.S.2d at 447.
" See 63 N.Y.2d at 360, 472 N.E.2d at 297, 482 N.Y.S.2d at 447.
" See id., 472 N.E.2d at 298, 482 N.Y.S.2d at 448.
" See New York City Health & Hospitals Corp. v. Sulsona, 81 Misc. 2d 1002, 1004-05, 367
N.Y.S.2d 686, 689-91 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1975); In re Jones, 107 Misc. 2d 290, 292, 433
N.Y.S.2d 984, 984-85 (Sup. Ct. Onondaga County 1980).
81 Misc. 2d 1002, 367 N.Y.S.2d 686 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1975). In Sulsona, the New
York City Health & Hosps. Corp. brought an action seeking a legal definition of the word
"death" as used in §§ 4301 and 4306 of the Public Iealth Law. Id. at 1003, 367 N.Y.S.2d at
687; see N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW §§ 4300-4307 (McKinney 1977). The controversy arose when
doctors declined to remove organs from a brain dead patient, thus depriving two potential
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"death," as used in the Uniform Anatomical Gifts Act,83 was intended to
be defined in accordance with the generally accepted practice of the med-
ical community involved in effectuating the purposes of the Act.38 Brain
death was the generally accepted standard in non-homicide cases."5 Five
years after Sulsona, the supreme court again stated that brain death, as
medically defined, was legally sufficient for determining death." These
cases represented a step toward acceptance of the brain death standard in
New York; nevertheless, they simultaneously created a logical inconsis-
tency in the law: a homicide victim who suffered brain death while in one
county could be pronounced dead, while a homicide victim in the same
condition in another county was still legally alive. "1
The resulting confusion is dramatically illustrated in People v.
Bonilla," in which the Appellate Division declined to define death on the
ground that such a definition would constitute an unnecessary and im-
proper usurpation of "the legislative function."' 8 Choosing, instead, to
donees of needed transplants. 81 Misc. 2d at 1004, 367 N.Y.S.2d at 688. The refusal was
based on two grounds: (1) the hospital was doubtful that neurological (brain) death would
be recognized legally and feared liability; and (2) the Chief Medical Examiner prohibited
the removal of organs from any homicide victims, whether brain dead or clinically dead. Id.
The hospital, prompted by these events, commenced the action so that the doctors could
legally remove the kidneys of Daniel Sulsona, a gunshot victim who was neurologically dead.
Id. at 1004-05, 367 N.Y.S.2d at 688-89. After hearing testimony from five medical experts,
the court concluded that there is a uniformly accepted medical standard of death, which
includes, inter alia, the brain death criteria. See id. at 1005-06, 367 N.Y.S.2d at 689-90. The
court also recognized that there was a "clear legislative understanding" that the Public
Health Law "would be affectuated by duly licensed medical doctors acting in accordance
with generally accepted medical standards." Id. at 1007, 367 N.Y.S.2d at 691.
" N.Y. Pus. HAsLTH LAW §§ 4300-4307 (McKinney 1977) (adopting Uniform Anatomical,
Gifts Act). The Uniform Anatomical Gifts Act has been adopted by all 50 states and the
District of Columbia. See id. Art. 43 (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985). The law provides that
any anatomical gift, made by will or other document, becomes effective "upon the death of
the donor," but the word "death" is not defined. See id. § 4303(2).
8 See 81 Misc. 2d at 1007, 367 N.Y.S.2d at 691.
" See id. at 1003-04, 367 N.Y.S.2d at 687-88. In a policy memorandum appended to and
"incorporated" into the Eulo opinion, the medical examiner and other concerned officials
stated that, pending clarification of the law, the removal of organs from homicide victims
would only be authorized in cases involving the cessation of spontaneous heart function. Id.
at 1010, 367 N.Y.S.2d at 693.
40 In re Jones, 107 Misc. 2d at 292, 433 N.Y.S.2d at 986.
" Cf. Bacchiochi v. Johnson Memorial Hosp., No. 256126 (Conn. Super. Ct. Hartford/New
Britain, Mar. 13, 1981) (Connecticut brain death standard applied only to transplant cases);
Fabro, Bacchiochi v. Johnson Memorial Hosp., 45 CONN. MED. 267 (1981) ("[ilt is ironic
that if the patient had been a donor, she could have been pronounced dead . . .and the
respirator could have been withdrawn. Dead for transplantation, but not dead otherwise!"),
cited in Abram, supra note 5, at 1201 n.38.
" 95 App. Div. 2d 396, 467 N.Y.S.2d 599 (2d Dep't 1983).
41 See id. at 407, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 606.
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grapple with the troublesome issue of causation,"' the majority held that
the defendant's actions constituted such a substantial and direct factor in
the chain of events leading to the victims' death that the imposition of
liability for homicide was warranted."5 Justice Titone, concurring in part
and dissenting in part, maintained that the transplant surgery could have
been a superseding cause, and argued for a modification of the conviction
to assault in the second degree because the prosecution had failed to sus-
tain its burden of proof."
It is submitted that, because the Bonilla decision is only persuasive
authority in the other Appellate Departments, another court could adopt
Justice Titone's position and expose surgeons to both criminal and civil
liability.47 While it appears that no United States court has yet imposed
" See id. at 409-12, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 607-10; id. at 413-22, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 610-15 (Niehoff,
J., concurring); id. at 432-33, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 621-22 (Titone, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
41 Id. at 409, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 608. According to the majority, "[t]he bullet wound to the
brain was the proximate cause of death and the homicide was properly attributed to the
defendant." Id. The court noted that "[i]ntervention of a secondary agency constitutes a
defense only if the death is solely attributable to it." Id. The organ removal, therefore, was
not deemed a superseding cause.
46 Id. at 432, 436-38, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 621, 623-24 (Titone, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part). Justice Titone used the following illustration to emphasize the possibility that
transplant surgery could have been a superseding cause:
[I]f the defendant has inflicted a wound which would prove fatal and a third
party comes along while the victim has but hours to live and kills him instantly, the
third-party's act substantially hastening death constitutes the cause of death and the
defendant cannot be convicted of homicide.
Id. at 432, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 621 (Titone, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.) Jus-
tice Titone also argued that the acts of the doctors were neither forseeable nor in the ordi-
nary course of treatment. Id. at 434, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 622 (Titone, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
A similar position was adopted by a California court in People v. Flores, No. 20190
(Sonoma County Mun. Ct. Cal. Dec. 19, 1973), No. N746-C (Sonoma County Super. Ct. Cal.
July 23, 1974). In that case, the defendant, driving on the wrong side of the road, hit an
oncoming car. Id. One of the passengers suffered brain death, and her heart was removed for
transplantation. Id. In his defense to a charge of manslaughter, the defendant argued that
the acts of the physicians constituted an intervening cause of the victim's death. See id. The
municipal judge agreed, and defendant was held liable for drunken driving only. Id. On
appeal to the Superior Court, Flores was convicted of manslaughter, but received a sentence
of less than five months. See Veith, Fein, Tendler, Veatch, Kleiman & Kalkines, Brain
Death: II. A Status Report of Legal Considerations, 238 J. A.M.A. 1744, 1746 (1977). Cali-
fornia subsequently adopted the brain death standard by statute. See CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE §§ 7180-7183 (Deering Supp. 1985).
"' In at least one jurisdiction, physicians transplanting organs from brain dead donors were
exposed to the risk of liability for wrongful death. See Tucker v. Lower, No. 2831 (Ct. Law
& Eq. Richmond, Va., May 25, 1972) (an unreported case appearing in The National Ob-
server, June 3, 1972, at 1, col. 1); see also Comment, But When Did He Die?: Tucker v.
Lower and the Brain-Death Concept, 12 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 424 (1975) (calling for legisla-
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liability for homicide on physicians,4" the imposition of such liability is
theoretically possible.4 Not surprisingly, the awareness of this fact has
had a chilling effect on members of transplant teams.50 The Bonilla deci-
sion, it is submitted, did little to rectify this situation.
The unsettled case law and the legislative impasse on the issue sug-
gest that the Court of Appeals acted properly in annunciating a definitive
statement regarding a defendant's criminal responsibility for causing
brain death. While legislative action is perhaps more desirable, judicial
action should not necessarily be precluded.51 In New York, the Legisla-
tive determination of when death occurs based on neurological criteria). Tucker involved a
brain dead patient who was attached to a respirator. See Comment, supra, at 425-26. When
repeated attempts to contact the next of kin failed, Tucker's heart was removed and trans-
planted into a waiting recipient. Id. Thereafter, the administrator of Tucker's estate
brought a wrongful death action against the surgeons. Id. at 427-28. The crucial issue that
the court determined was when the death occurred. Id. at 428. During the trial, the judge
ruled that he would reject the defendant's attempt to establish brain death as a rule of law.
Id. at 428-29. When charging the jury, however, he gave the following instruction:
[Y]ou shall determine the time of death in this case by using the following defini-
tion of the nature of death. Death is a cessation of life. It is the ceasing to exist.
Under the law, death is not continuing but occurs at a precise time . . . [Ylou may
consider the following elements ... [including] the time of complete and irreversible
loss of all function of the brain.
Id. at 424. The jury returned a verdict for the surgeons. Id. at 429. One juror later stated
one of the important factors in arriving at his decision: "It was clearly proved in the trial a
man ... cannot live without a functioning brain." Id.
'8 Note, The Uniform Determination of Death Act: An Effective Solution to the Problem
of Defining Death, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1511, 1516 (1982).
'9 See id.; see also In re Eichner, 73 App. Div. 2d 431, 450, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517, 533 (2d Dep't
1980) (dictum) (physician arguably commits some form of homicide when removing life-
sustaining respirator), modified, 52 N.Y.2d 363 (1981).
60 See Paris & Cranford, Definition of Brain Death, 40 THEOLOGY TODAY 5, 6 (1983). Dr.
Arthur Rose, a neurologist at University Hospital in Stony Brook, commented that doctors
"will not pull the plug without a court order. The potential liability is just too great." Id.
Indeed, the first assistant district attorney of Rensselaer County, Robert Adams, stated that
there are a number of district attorneys in New York "anxious to pursue such charges [of
.homicide]." Id.
" See Capron & Kass, A Statutory Definition of the Standards for Determining Human
Death: An Appraisal and a Proposal, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 87, 101 n.55 (1972). In 1976 the
Law Reform Commission of Canada began its Report on the Protection of Life Project. See
Law Reform Comm'n of Canada, Report 15, Criteria for the Determination of Death 1
(1981). According to this study, deriving a legislative solution has received increasing sup-
port and now represents the majority view in Canada. Id. at 10. The President's Commis-
sion undertook a similar study in the United States in 1981, recommending that state legis-
latures set rules for determining human death that incorporate brain-oriented techniques.
See President's Comm'n, supra note 1, at 1, 55.
Legislative reform is considered more favorable than judicial revision of the common
law because judicial revision is contingent upon litigation. Id. at 48. Litigation addresses the
conflicting views of the parties involved in a dispute and all the viewpoints relating to the
broader issues surrounding the determination of death may not be considered. Id. Since the
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ture's failure to act was due in large part to pressure from pro-life groups
that feared that the adoption of brain death criteria would lead to the
acceptance of euthanasia.5 2 The issues surrounding the "mercy killing" of
a terminally ill patient, however, are not identical to the issue of brain
death because a patient who suffers from the total and irreversible cessa-
courts generally cannot conduct independent investigations, their decisions may not be as
well-grounded as a legislative determination based upon extensive research. See id. Further-
more, by interpreting the holding to be confined to the facts of that case, a lower court may
disregard a broad rule of law laid down by a higher court. See id. at 49. However, several
"pro-legislative reform" commentators do acknowledge that when a legislature fails to act,
judicial revision should not be precluded. See Capron & Kass, supra, at 100 n.55.
It has been argued that the public and its representatives can be involved in the formu-
lation and adoption of a standard for determining death. President's Comm'n, supra note 1,
at 95. For example, public discussion by such organizations as the press and civic groups
could be encouraged. Id. An ad hoc committee "to evaluate public attitudes toward the
changes wrought by biomedical advances" could be established. Id. The encouragement of
public involvement is desirable because the determination of death concerns "pervasive pol-
icy decisions." Charron, Death: A Philosophical Perspective on the Legal Definitions, 1975
WASH. U.L.Q. 979, 985. It is arguable that in a democratic and pluralistic society, such basic
questions should not be determined by only one segment of the population. Id. at 986.
5' See Paris & Cranford, supra note 50, at 6, 9. "Euthanasia" is a derivative of two Greek
words meaning "good death" or "happy death." B. ASHLEY & K. O'RouRKE, HEALTH CARE
ETHIcs-A THEOLOGIcAL ANALYSIS 375 (1982). Generally the medical profession has rejected
euthanasia through the Hippocratic Oath and other more recent codes of medical ethics. Id.
at 380. Today euthanasia is generally considered to be of two types: active and passive. Id.
Active euthanasia .is considered the ordinary act of killing for "merciful" reasons, while pas-
sive euthanasia is the withholding of treatment, or letting the patient die. Id.
The New York Legislature has rejected a determination of death statute five times. See
Paris & Cranford, supra note 50, at 6. Numerous religious and pro-life groups have lobbied
against this statute on the ground that it is, inter alia, a "stepping stone to euthanasia." Id.
at 9. This position has influenced the political statements of many Catholic bishops, who in
turn influence the Legislature. Id. at 10. Senator Bertonazzi of Massachusetts attributes this
power over legislators to the bishops' "well-known ability to punish or reward legislators."
Id. at 10-11.
A determination of death statute incorporating brain related criteria would probably,
however, weaken the arguments supporting the legalization of euthanasia, since it might
"eliminate some false classifications of dead individuals [as being] among the living." Presi-
dent's Comm'n, supra note 1, at 11 n.6 (quoting noted Christian ethicist Germain Grisez).
By clearly delineating between total brain death and other brain-damaged states, a well-
composed determination of death law will in effect prohibit euthanasia by allowing only
those who are truly dead to be pronounced dead. Horan, supra note 5, at 26. Furthermore,
rather than considering brain death anti-life or immoral, official Roman Catholic dogma
supports the adoption of the concept, as long as the declaration of death is medically certain
and the brain death is total. See B. ASHLEY & K. O'RouRKE, supra, at 364-68. The rationale
for the position of the Church is that when the brain is dead the soul can no longer inform
the body. Id. Pope Pius XII stated that verification of the fact of death "cannot be deduced
from any religious and moral principle[s] ...and does not fall within the competence of
the Church." Pope Pius XII, The Prolongation of Life (an address to an international con-
gress of anesthesiologists) reprinted in 4 THE POPE SPEAKS 393, 398 (1957).
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tion of brain function is already dead.53 The guidelines annunciated by
the Eulo court not only preclude any possibility of euthanasia, but also
eliminate a number of problems created by the alternative versions of
determination of death statutes adopted in other states. 54
53 See People v. Eulo, 63 N.Y.2d 341, 357, 472 N.E.2d 286, 295, 482 N.Y.S.2d 436, 445
(1984) (question of when person would be allowed to die "qualitatively distinct" issue); Peo-
ple v. Bonilla, 95 App. Div. 2d 396, 434-35, 467 N.Y.S.2d 599, 622-23 (2d Dep't 1983)
(Titone, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), aff'd, People v. Eulo, 63 N.Y.2d 341,
472 N.E.2d 286, 482 N.Y.S.2d 436 (1984).
Pro-life groups should direct their lobbying efforts against acceptance of a cerebral
death standard. See D. WALTON, BRAIN DEATH: ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 20, 21 (1980). Al-
though often confused with brain death, the term cerebral death actually refers to the irre-
versible destruction of both cerebral hemispheres, exclusive of the brain stem and the cere-
bellum. Id. A patient suffering cerebral death, therefore, is still capable of spontaneous
respiration and circulation. See Law Reform Comm'n of Canada, supra note 51, at 16. This
condition is interchangeably called apallic syndrome, neocortical death, persistent vegetative
state, or coma. D. WALTON, supra, at 21. The medical and legal communities overwhelmingly
reject the concept of cerebral death as the proper neurological basis for determining death.
See President's Comm'n, supra note 1, at 18. Acceptance of a cerebral death standard
would presume a determination that the cerebrum, rather than the entire brain, is the vital
organ of life. See Guthrie, supra note 2, at 48. It has not yet been established, however, that
this part of the brain alone is responsible for intelligence and free will. See A. MORACZEWSKI
& J. SHOWALTER, DETERMINATION OF DEATH 18 (1982). Until the center of "humanness" can
be conclusively established, a total brain death standard is required. Id.
In addition, pro-life groups should advocate improved training and supervision of those
who are responsible for interpreting the medical criteria. See B. ASHLEY & K. O'ROuRKE,
supra note 52, at 367. Ethical concern over the accuracy of the criteria and the certainty of
the diagnosis is not unique to the brain death controversy. See President's Comm'n, supra
note 1, at 82. Pronouncements of death based upon heart-lung criteria are also subject to
mistake. See id.
Archbishop John Roach of Pennsylvania has argued that the role of the Church in the
political arena should be based on reasoned argumentation. Paris & Cranford, supra note
50, at 14. Following his lead, the Pennsylvania bishops subjected the traditional charges
against the determination of death legislation to a critical analysis, and produced a point by
point refutation. Id. It is submitted that other religious and pro-life groups that have
adopted an anti-brain death stance should reevaluate their position in light of the Arch-
bishop's statement.
" See supra note 6. Statutes that allow physicians to pronounce death based upon either
heart-lung or brain-related criteria have been criticized for implying that two different mo-
ments of death exist-one for donors and a later one for nondonors. Capron & Kass, supra
note 51, at 109-10; see, e.g., MD. HEALTH CODE ANN. § 5-202 (1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-
501 (1983). Arguably, such statutes present a confusing picture to the lay public because
they do not clearly establish when or why brain-based criteria are to be used. Cf. Charron,
supra note 51, at 989 (determination of death law must avoid "indeterminacy of applica-
tion" when all pertinent facts of case known).
When a statute provides for the determination of death based upon the cessation of
brain function only, hospitals would ostensibly be precluded from employing the traditional
criteria, thereby preventing physicians from pronouncing death unless sophisticated ma-
chinery for measuring brain activity was available. Comment, supra note 5, at 634; see, e.g.,
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch 110 1/2 § 302 (Smith-Hurd 1978).
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It is suggested that the judicial determination of death rule in New
York sets forth a straightforward standard for the medical and legal com-
munities that is also understandable to the lay public. While ordinarily
death will be determined by the heart-lung criteria,55 brain death criteria
will be considered only when respiration and circulation are maintained
by mechanical means.5 6 Furthermore, the cessation of brain function
must be total,7 thereby precluding a diagnosis of death based on a state
of coma.5 8 Thus, the life of the victim is safeguarded while the physician's
responsibility for a correct diagnosis of death is made contingent solely
upon a correct interpretation of the medical data, rather than upon any
legal idiosyncrasy.
THE MORAL RAMIFICATIONS OF Eulo
In the broader scheme, People v. Eulo is more than merely a solution
to the legal problem of causation-it is an acknowledgement of the essen-
tial integrity of human life, 59 and a recognition that, without the unity
provided by a functioning brain, the body is merely a group of organs
without purpose.60 By not postponing the legal recognition of the medical
fact of death, the individual may properly be accorded the dignity and
respect owed to the dead. 1
Finally, statutes that provide that the physician may pronounce death based on irre-
versible cessation of brain function are arguably vague because they also offer no guidance
as to when the brain-related criteria are to be employed. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 88-
1715.1 (1978). The Georgia statute was subsequently revised to provide that a person may
be pronounced dead if he has suffered either irreversible cessation of circulation and respi-
ration or irreversible cessation of all brain functions. See id. § 88-1716 (1985). Cf. Charron,
supra note 51, at 989 (law must avoid indeterminacy of application).
" People v. Eulo, 63 N.Y.2d at 355, 472 N.E.2d at 295, 482 N.Y.S.2d at 445.
5' See id. at 355-56, 472 N.E.2d at 295, 482 N.Y.S.2d at 445.
51 See id. at 356, 472 N.E.2d at 295, 482 N.Y.S2d at 445.
68 See id. at 358 n.30, 472 N.E.2d at 296 n.30, 482 N.Y.S.2d at 446 n.30.
51 See B. ASHLEY & K. O'RoURKE, supra note 52, at 365-66. In determining death, the physi-
cian is not called upon to decide whether any life is present (as in the sense of a residual life
comparable to that of plants and animals) but must determine whether "human life in the
most radical sense of a unified human person is still present." Id. at 366.
0 See President's Comm'n, supra note 1, at 35-36 & n.4 (in case of absence of all brain
functions, what remains is merely group of artificially maintained subsystems). There are
two complementary "whole brain" theories, that the Commission supports. Id. at 32-36. The
first theory considers that the major organs of the body work in an integrated manner, while
acknowledging that the brain plays an important role. Id. The second theory considers the
brain primary, as organizer and regulator of bodily functions. Id. at 34-36. Furthermore,
while many of an individual's vital organs can be either replaced or artificially supported,
this is not true of the brain. See Note, The Time of Death-A Legal, Ethical, and Medical
Dilemma, 18 CATH. LAW. 243, 244-45 (1972).
1 See R. VEATCH, DEATH, DYING AND THE BIOLOGICAL REVOLUTION 34, 36 (1976) ("affront to
the dignity of individual persons to treat them as alive if they are dead"). When an individ-
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Recognition of brain death also puts the responsibility for the pro-
longation of life into its proper ethical perspective.62 Those who reasona-
bly have a chance of survival through transplantation surgery are now
able to receive the best tissue available.6 3 Furthermore, maintenance of
life support systems in cases of brain death places a burden on society
because valuable medical and economic resources are wasted."' Utilization
of the brain death standard allows the efforts of the medical profession to
be focused on the living rather than the dead.6" Finally, this approach will
spare the patient's family some of the emotional and economic burdens
imposed by the needless prolongation of a hopeless situation. 6
CONCLUSION
In People v. Eulo the New York Court of Appeals was faced with the
question of whether or not to recognize brain-related criteria for deter-
mining death in homicide cases. Despite repeated rejections of determina-
tion of death statutes by the Legislature, the court took the bold step of
adopting the brain death standard. In doing so, it handed down a rule
that synthesized the common law with the state of modern medicine. As a
result, defendants are no longer able to escape liability for their actions
through a loophole created by an outmoded legal principle. Justice is
served while the dignity of the victim is protected.
Linda Plona Poppe
ual is pronounced dead, the living go into mourning, prepare a funeral, etc. Id. at 26. This
reverence is appropriate because a sacred human life once informed the remaining cadaver.
B. ASHLEY & K. O'RoURKE, supra note 52, at 372. The practice of transplantation is not
inconsistent with the respect normally accorded to the bodies of deceased persons. Id. at
373-74. The Christian view is that this practice is to be encouraged if a true need exists. Id.
(citing statement of Pope Pius XII (1956)).
6' Cf. Moore, Medical Responsibility for the Prolongation of Life, 206 J. A.M.A. 384, 386
(1968) (prolongation of life responsibility of medical profession).
63 See id.
" See Paris & Cranford, supra note 50, at 13; Veith, Fein, Tendler, Veatch, Kleiman &
Kalkines, supra note 5, at 1653. On average there are 204 cases of artificial maintenance per
month in the major medical centers. Paris & Cranford, supra note 50, at 13.
65 See Moore, supra note 62, at 384.
6 See Hirsh, supra note 1, at 37. Medical costs of prolonged maintenance typically are
extremely high and could bankrupt the individual responsible for the patient's care. Id.
Furthermore, postponement of the declaration of death prevents the family from facing the
inevitable reality of the situation and denies them the opportunity to deal with death with
dignity. Cf. Veith, Fein, Tendler, Veatch, Kleiman & Kalkines, supra note 46, at 1745.

